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Abstract
We consider a real business cycle model with a productive externality and an aggregate non-
convex technology set µ a la Benhabib and Farmer embodying capacity utilization, which exhibits
indeterminacy of the steady state and multiplicity of deterministic equilibria under plausible values
of the increasing returns to scale. The aim of the paper is to rank these di®erent equilibria according
to the initial value of consumption using both a linear-quadratic approximation, extensively explained
by Benigno and Woodford [2006a, 2006b], and simulation methods. We study the implications of such
a ranking in terms of smoothness of the welfare-maximizing trajectory and show that the welfare-
maximizing consumption and labor paths are all the smoother since the level of increasing returns is
low. At last, we show that this solution provides a good benchmark for judging the desirability of
the stabilization policy proposed by Guo and Lansing [1997].
Keywords: Increasing returns, Local indeterminacy, Welfare analysis, Numerical Methods.
JEL classi¯cation: E32, E4, H61, O42, O47.
1 Introduction
In standard business cycle models, °uctuations in consumption and labor are generally welfare-diminishing
compared to a smooth consumption/investment plan when the utility function is concave. In the presence
of productive externalities, however, the welfare loss implied by °uctuations may be more than compen-
sated by the gain inherited from the non-convexities of the production set. Christiano and Harrison
[1999], for instance, have established that increasing volatility of labor may raise welfare in an economy
with a non-convex technology set µ a la Benhabib and Farmer [1994]: for a given capital stock, by bunching
hard work, agents are able to increase the average level of consumption without raising the average level
of labor. When disutility of labor does not raise disproportionately to the additional utility procured by
consumption during the periods of hard working, the \bunching" e®ect dominates the former negative
\concavity" e®ect and makes the agents better-o®. Thus, when the steady state equilibrium is locally
indeterminate, that is when there is multiplicity of deterministic equilibria around the steady state, some
equilibria may be welfare-improving compared to others.1
In the literature the possibility of stabilizing an economy characterized by local indeterminacy has
been analyzed in such a framework by Guo and Lansing [1998] to prevent the agents from the endogenous
°uctuations caused by indeterminacy and the opportunity of equilibrium path switching.2 Surprisingly,
no much attention has been dedicated to the choice of the best equilibrium path on which the economy
has to be stabilized, as if a stabilization scheme would necessarily improve welfare. But it is clear that a
1Contrary to Christiano and Harisson [1999] whose model relies on a welfare comparison between stochastic equilibria
and the steady state, this paper focuses on a welfare comparison within the continuum of deterministic equilibria converging
to the steady state in case of indeterminacy.
2Economic policies constructed to stabilize the economy by minimizing the variance of output have also been analyzed
in models in which the level of externality required to get indeterminacy is less stringent than in the current framework.
See for instance Guo and Harrison [2001] or Sim [2005].
1stabilizing policy can make the agents worse-o® when expectations are pinned down on a suboptimal path.
From Pareto's criterion viewpoint, any (decentralized) deterministic equilibrium path of the Benhabib and
Farmer economy is not e±cient as long as agents do not grasp the externality of production. Nevertheless,
from a welfare viewpoint, these deterministic equilibria do not display the same level of utility: the
optimization programme fails to determine which of them provides the maximum amount of welfare since
they all satisfy the ¯rst order conditions and the transversality condition.
In this paper we make use of a linear-quadratic approximation to provide a welfare ranking of the
di®erent deterministic equilibria when the steady state is locally indeterminate. This method popularized
by Benigno and Woodford [2006a, 2006b] consists in deriving a problem with linear constraints and a
quadratic objective that approximates the exact problem. They show that more basic second-order
perturbations can prove to be inaccurate in providing an exact welfare measure of alternative policy rules
because they lead to a false approximation of the optimal policy rule. We thus rewrite the problem of
the representative agent using this linear-quadratic approximation and determine the welfare-maximizing
path that the original optimization program fails to select in the presence of su±ciently large increasing
returns to scale. We prove that the starting value of consumption determines simultaneously the speed
of the capital accumulation and the desirability of a deterministic path switching. Actually, we translate
and investigate the concavity and the bunching e®ects developed by Christiano and Harrison in terms
of monotonicity of the consumption/investment plan. It will be shown that the (decentralized) welfare-
maximizing equilibrium displays a path all the less monotonic and an initial level of consumption all the
higher since increasing returns to scale are high.
Bunching hard work in the very ¯rst periods makes capital accumulation faster. In the next periods,
agents can bene¯t from the high level of capital stock by maintaining a high level of consumption but
decreasing labor signi¯cantly. When increasing returns are high enough, reaching the welfare-maximizing
capital stock requires relatively few time and e®ort, which explains the non-monotonicity of the equilib-
rium (or even the cyclicity of the solution) during the ¯rst periods. However, when increasing returns
are close to the condition of indeterminacy, bunching hard work in the ¯rst periods is not su±cient to
accumulate quickly a large capital stock, which would require huge levels of labor and a loss of welfare
that next periods consumption cannot o®set. Thus, when increasing returns to scale are not high enough,
the welfare-maximizing equilibrium consists in minimizing the variance of labor, smoothing consumption
and accumulating the capital stock progressively.
It has already been shown, for instance by Dupor and Lehnert [2002], that the derivation of the central
planner optimal solution when indeterminacy occurs is not straightforward to compute, if not impossible
formally. In this context, the welfare-maximizing path obtained by the way of the linear-quadratic
approximation provides an excellent benchmark for judging the desirability of the stabilization policy
proposed by Guo and Lansing. We prove that the tax policy they propose to prevent the economy from
endogenous °uctuations generally deteriorates welfare compared to the welfare-maximizing equilibrium:
the tax scheme smooths the consumption path while su±cient increasing returns to scale would require
optimal °uctuations. We also provide an alternative policy able to pin down expectations on the welfare-
maximizing equilibrium to reach the double-objection of stabilization and welfare-improvement. This can
be done by targeting the rental rate on capital or the real wage at one or several periods of time.
After presenting brie°y in section 2 the main characteristics of the model and the condition for inde-
terminacy, we assume this condition satis¯ed and de¯ne in section 3 the linear-quadratic approximation
associated to the original problem and the dynamics of the economy. We also specify the set of monotonic
consumption paths for any value of the parameters. These results are helpful in establishing the welfare
ranking of section 4: simulation methods are used when a formal derivation appears too tricky. We
compare the welfare-maximizing equilibrium path with the Guo-Lansing stabilization solution in section
5 and draw the conclusions for economic policy in section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Model Setup
The general framework of this paper is a continuous-time model presented by Benhabib and Farmer
model [1994] and modi¯ed by Wen [1998] in a discrete-time version embodying capacity utilization. This
deterministic one-sector model with in¯nitely lived agents is characterized by a continuum of competitive
2¯rms, with the total number normalized to one. Social returns to scale are increasing since the presence
of a factor-speci¯c externality in production function. The individual ¯rms use the following technology:
Y (t) = A(t)[u(t)K(t)]aL(t)b with 0 < a < 1 and a + b = 1;
A(t) = [¹ u(t) ¹ K(t)]a° ¹ L(t)b° with ° > 0;
where Y is the total output, , u 2 (0;1) capacity utilization, ¹ K and ¹ L represent the average economy-
wide levels of capital (K) and labor (L). In equilibrium, u = ¹ u, K = ¹ K and L = ¹ L and by making the
parameters substitutions ® ´ a(1 + °) and ¯ ´ b(1 + °), we get the aggregate production function:
Y (t) = [u(t)K(t)]a(1+°)L(t)b(1+°) ´ [u(t)K(t)]®L(t)¯;
which obviously exhibits increasing returns to scale since ® + ¯ > 1. In the same time, the economy is
populated by a unit measure of identical in¯nitely lived consumers. The representative consumer, owner











where C and L are the consumer's consumption and hours worked. Under the assumption that market
factors are perfectly competitive, the budget constraint faced by the representative consumer is:
_ K(t) = (r(t) ¡ ±(t))K(t) + w(t)L(t) ¡ C(t); (2)
±(t) = ¿u(t)µ with 0 < ¿ < 1 and µ > 1;
where Â ¸ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ½ > 0 is the discount rate and ±(t) > 0
the depreciation rate at time t. Consumers derive income by supplying capital and labor services to ¯rms,
taking the rate of return on capital (r) and the real wage (w) as given.
Following Wen [1998], µ is chosen strictly greater than one in order to guarantee an interior steady
state value of the capacity utilization. Capacity utilization ampli¯es and propagates business cycle:
capital is more intensively used during economic booms when its marginal product is high.
In a symmetric perfect foresight equilibrium in which consumers maximize utility and ¯rms make zero
pro¯t, the equilibrium conditions can be expressed as an autonomous pair of di®erence equations after







e¹0+¹1k+¹2c ¡ ec¡k (3)






e¹0+¹1k+¹2c ¡ ½ (4)
where x = lnX, ¹0 = ¡
®(1+Â)ln(a=µ¿)+µ¯ lnb
µ¯+®(1+Â)¡µ(1+Â) ; ¹1 =
µ[(1¡®)(1+Â)¡¯]
µ¯+®(1+Â)¡µ(1+Â) and ¹2 =
µ¯
µ¯+®(1+Â)¡µ(1+Â).
It is straightforward to show that the above dynamical system possesses a unique interior steady state
and that under the condition ¯ µ
µ¡® ¡1¡Â > 0 this steady state is indeterminate.3 In the neighborhood
of this steady state, there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to it. In this framework, the
rational expectations hypothesis, which usually lead to a unique equilibrium path, cannot discriminate
between the di®erent equilibrium paths. However from a welfare viewpoint these paths are not equivalent
and a welfare ranking can be established.
3This condition for indeterminacy is necessary and su±cient in our continuous-time setup; however, in the discrete-time
model of Wen [1998], it is only necessary. For a perfectly elastic labor supply, that is when Â = 0 and for µ arbitrarily closed
to 1, the condition for indeterminacy collapses to ® + ¯ > 1 and is always satis¯ed under the assumption of increasing
returns to scale.
33 Solving the model
3.1 Linear-Quadratic approximation
In this section, we make use of the method developed by Fleming [1971], applied by Magill [1977] and
recently revisited by Benigno and Woodford [2006a, 2006b] that substitutes to the maximand (1) a
quadratic objective and to the law of motion of capital, equation (2), a linear constraint. This approxi-
mation does not consist of a basic Taylor expansion of the utility function but requires to substitute to
the linear terms of the Taylor expansion terms of order 2 obtained by a second-order approximation of
the ¯rst-order conditions.4
By contrast with a basic Taylor expansion, it can be proved that the linear-quadratic (LQ) approx-
imation leads to a correct linear approximation of the optimal policy rule. It is thus equivalent to use
this method to derive the linear approximations of capital and consumption around the steady state or
the original problem. Furthermore, it is now well known that ¯rst-order approximation techniques are
not always well suited to handle welfare comparisons.5 The LQ approximation, whose objective function
is quadratic, suits perfectly for problems of welfare comparisons.
From now, it will be assumed that the model exhibits local indeterminacy: both eigenvalues have
strictly negative real part and all equilibrium paths converge to the same steady state. Maximizing (1)
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µ¡®¡1¡Â), D2U and D2_ k are the Hessian matrix
of the utility function U and _ k (when the agents do not internalize the productive externality).
The quadratic approximation of ~ U(c(t);l(t)), namely ^ U(c(t);l(t)), associated to the linear approxi-
mation of the law of motion of capital, equation (2), form the LQ approximation of the original problem.
The ¯rst-order conditions of the reformulated programme give the approximations of capital and
consumption around the steady state, expressed in terms of deviation of the two variables k(t) and c(t)














































ª ¡ ± ¡ ¸2
¸
;
where ª ´ (½+±)=a, ± =
½
µ¡1 is the steady state value of capital depreciation and »1 and »2 are eigenvectors
associated to the eigenvalues ¸1 and ¸2, which can be obtained after computing the Jacobian of the system
4See Benigno and Woodford [2006a, 2006b] for more details in a discrete-time framework.
5This is especially the case for stochastic models, as already shown by Kim and Kim [2003] or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
[2004] among others, but the conclusion remains valid for deterministic framework as ours.
4formed by equations (3) and (4). Moreover, given a starting point [K(0);C(0)], we apply Cramer's rule
and deduce:
´1 =








To understand the economic implications of the equilibrium paths ranking in terms of intertemporal
consumption smoothness, we study in this subsection the conditions on c(0) under which the path is
monotonic. It is reminded that monotonicity only occurs when eigenvalues are real. In the following, we
will assume without loss of generality that ¸1 < ¸2 < 0.
De¯ne the stable arms of the dynamics the two equilibrium paths:
~ c(t) = ´iv2ie¸it; i = f1;2g;
and let c0;»i, i = f1;2g, be the starting log-values of consumption of such a path for a given initial stock
of capita K(0). These values are such that respectively ´1 and ´2 equalize zero, that is:








The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 For a given initial stock of capital K(0) < Ks (resp. K(0) > Ks), there exists a strictly
positive (resp. negative) "¤ such that for c(0) 2 [c0;»2 ¡"¤;c0;»1] (resp. [c0;»1;c0;»2 ¡"¤]) equilibrium paths
of consumption are monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix A:3.
4 Welfare comparisons
Once the local dynamics of the economy has been characterized through the LQ approximation, the next
objective is to select the initial level of consumption which the highest level of welfare is associated to. It
is worth noting here that a local analysis means as usual a choice of initial conditions for the aggregate
variables su±ciently close to their steady state values. In particular, we have referred to the contributions
of Russell and Zecevic [1998, 2000] in order to select initial level of consumptions in the region of stability.
We thus proceed in two steps.
First, we restrict the analysis to the lower bound of the externality above which indeterminacy occurs,
that is when ¯ µ
µ¡® tends to 1 ¡ Â. We thus determine analytically the unique equilibrium path and the
related welfare-maximizing starting value of consumption.6 The linear-quadratic approximation of the
utility function cannot be used for this speci¯c case since the Jacobian matrix is not properly de¯ned.7
However, some conjectures can be drawn for higher levels of the increasing returns when indeterminacy
occurs.
Second, making use of the linear-quadratic approximation and simulation methods we enlarge the
range of increasing returns to scale: we are then able to determine precisely a good approximation of
the true value of the welfare-maximizing starting value of consumption and the behavior of the related
consumption/investment plan whatever the values of the parameters.
6By the vocable \welfare-maximizing path" we mean the path making the agents better-o® from a decentralized view-
point, that is when the productive externality is considered as given. From the social planner viewpoint, that is when the
agents take into account the impact of their decisions on the utility and the income of the others, this path is undoubtedly
suboptimal. However, within the equilibrium paths selected by the representative agent the welfare-maximizing path returns
the higher level of utility. It is then important not to liken the optimal path of the economy to the welfare-maximizing
path.
7More precisely, the competitive equilibrium path of the main aggregate variables can be directly derived without
linearizing the system.
54.1 Speci¯c case for ¯ µ
µ¡® = 1 + Â
When ¯ µ
µ¡® tends to 1 + Â, neither the approximation of ~ l nor the Jacobian matrix are de¯ned (some
terms tend to in¯nity). For this speci¯c value of the increasing returns, the equilibrium path is unique
and the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 When ¯ µ
µ¡® = 1 + Â, the welfare-maximizing path is monotonic and starts with c(0) =
c0;»2.
Proof. When ¯ µ
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~ k. By equalizing _ C=C and ® µ¡1

































There is a correspondence between K, C, L and u: the welfare-maximizing path is then unique.
By substituting the welfare-maximizing values of u, L and C respect to K in _ K, one can show that
for K < Ks (resp. K > Ks) _ K > 0 (resp. _ K < 0) and then that the capital stock evolves monotonically
to the steady state. So do capacity utilization, labor and consumption.
For a given K0 the welfare-maximizing path is such that ~ c(0) = ® µ¡1
µ¡®
~ k(0). Since v22=v12 tends to
µ¡1
µ¡® when ¯ µ
µ¡® tends to 1+Â, according to equation (8) the optimal path starts with an initial level of
consumption c(0) = c0;»2.










the relationship between ~ c(t) and ~ k(t) is (approximatively) maintained also when ° increases and ¯ µ
µ¡® =
1 + Â > 0 (however close enough to zero). Since ~ c(t) » ®~ k(t) then
c(0) » c0;»2:
Some conclusions about the welfare-maximizing path can be drawn as ¯ µ
µ¡® increases from 1 + Â: as





maximum for jc(0)j as high as possible, i.e. c(0) = c0;»2 ¡ "¤.8 When ¯ µ
µ¡® ¡ 1 ¡ Â increases from zero,
increasing j~ l(t)j yields a mid decrease of U1(t) for given ~ c and ~ k while U2(t) can be increased provided
c(0) gets closer to c0;»2 ¡ "¤.
Thus, as ¯ µ
µ¡® increases from 1 + Â, we expect a decrease of the welfare-maximizing c(0) relatively
to c0;»2. We then switch to simulation methods to enlarge the set of possible levels of increasing returns
to scale and check whether or not the agents have interest to keep choosing a non-monotonic equilibrium
path, i.e. a starting value of consumption that is lower than c0;»2 ¡ "¤ or higher than c0;»1. This is the
objective of the next subsection.
8Since ~ c(t) » ®~ k(t), the welfare-maximizing path must be monotonic and c(0) must be greater or equal to c0;»2 ¡ "¤.
64.2 Simulation methods
For a predetermined stock of capital K(0) and a given initial level of consumption C(0), we can compute
using system (6) the multiple equilibrium paths of capital and consumption each of them associated to
a di®erent choice of initial consumption. Once the associated competitive equilibrium path of labor has
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and the log-variations of consumption and labor have been replaced in the objective function (5), the






Computationally, we solve numerically the integral and obtain a quadratic approximation of the
maximand (11) of the form:
^ U[c(0)] = n1c(0)2 + n2c(0) + n3;
where n1 < 0 and whose maximum is reached for:9
c¤(0) = ¡2n1=n2:
We parameterize the economy as follows. The capital share ¯ts the average annual value of a = 0:29
over the 1950-85 period as reported in Greenwood et al. [1988]. Following Hansen [1985] and the
argument that labor, if indivisible at the individual level, behaves as if it were in¯nitely elastic, the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor is set to Â = 0. The values of ¿ and µ are assigned to match
both the long-run average of 81% for the past several years found by the Federal Reserve Bank [2008]
and the depreciation rate of capital of ± = 0:12 estimated by Nadiri and Prucha [1997]. The discount
rate ½ = 0:02 corresponds approximatively to a discount factor of 0:98 (which usually oscillates between
0:95 and 0:99 in the literature). The initial value of capital is set close enough (but not too close) to
the steady state at k0 = 0:9ks.10 Then, for di®erent sizes of the increasing returns to scale, °, we obtain
¯gures 1 and 2.
On ¯gure 1, we have sketched the welfare-maximizing value of c(0) in addition to c0;»2¡"¤ and c0;»2 as
the degree of increasing returns to scale ° increases for values satisfying the condition for indeterminacy.
These results con¯rm proposition 2, which predicts that within the set of monotonic paths, the maximizing
welfare equilibrium starts with an initial level of consumption c(0) = c0;»2. They also con¯rm our
conjecture that this initial level tends to get closer to c0;»2 ¡ "¤ as ° increases.
When the real part of both eigenvalues merge (as shown on ¯gure 2) and become complex, it can
be easily seen from equations (7) and (8) that Re(v21=v11) = Re(v22=v12) and then that Re(c0;»1) =
Re(c0;»2) = Re(c0;»2¡"¤). For higher level of increasing returns, the welfare-maximizing path is no longer
monotonic. However, it must be noticed that the welfare-maximizing path becomes non-monotonic before
this threshold. Since c0;»2¡"¤ increases faster than c¤(0) there is a level of increasing returns above which
the maximum welfare is reached for an initial level of consumption c¤(0) outside the range [c0;»2¡"¤;c0;»1],
meaning that the welfare-maximizing path is °uctuating. Smoothness of the consumption path shrinks
and de¯nitely disappears as the eigenvalues become complex: the welfare-maximizing path is then cycling.
The presence of cycles is not surprising: Dupor and Lehnert [2002] have already investigated for speci¯c
values of the increasing returns and labor elasticity the social planner's solution of such an economy and
evoked the plausibility of optimal cyclicity. However, in the absence of precise formulation of this optimal
path the welfare-maximizing path we found remains the best benchmark for any stabilization policy.
9For given levels of labor elasticity and capital share, large degrees of increasing returns change the physiognomy of
^ U[c(0)]: n1 > 0. There is a shift in the welfare-maximizing starting value of consumption and a corner solution appears.
However, these cases are not easily tractable since we do not have an exact measure of the range of plausible values for the
starting value of consumption.
10Alternative computations have been derived with k0 = 0:99ks and k0 = 0:999ks but do not a®ect the conclusions. The
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A sensitivity analysis shows that the con¯guration above is stable for a change in the parameter values.
However, a decrease in labor elasticity (or equivalently an increase of Â) strengthens the condition for
indeterminacy and imposes a shift to the right of the point of intersection between the dashed line and
the dashed-dotted line. By raising the value of µ, a decrease of the depreciation rate ± or an increase of
the rate of time preference ½ have the same impact.11
A point has to be stressed however: it is clear from the simulations below that the point of intersection
(PI) is all the higher compared to the lower bound of the increasing returns to scale (IRS) required to
get indeterminacy since the condition for indeterminacy is strengthened.
Parameter values Lower bound of IRS %-deviation of the PI
± = :12, ½ = :02, Â = 0 0.043 0.081%
± = :10, ½ = :02, Â = 0 0.051 0.122%
± = :10, ½ = :05, Â = 0 0.107 0.457%
± = :10, ½ = :05, Â = 0:25 0.313 2.078%
Thus, the range of monotonic paths enlarges as ±, ½ or Â increases. As a consequence, the more
the condition for indeterminacy is strengthened the more likely the welfare-maximizing path is to be
monotonic. The one-sector Benhabib and Farmer model [1994] provides a limit case (¯gures 3 and 3):
for low elasticities of labor and high capital shares, eigenvalues may not merge, the welfare-maximizing
values of initial consumption may remain inside the range [c0;»2 ¡"¤;c0;»2] and non-monotonic paths may
never be welfare-maximizing.
At last, it is worth noting that the welfare-maximizing path is not always increasing. For some values
of the parameters, the steady state value of consumption is decreasing as the degree of increasing returns
increases. These cases correspond to mathematical oddness and are irrelevant for the purpose of this
paper: since the labor steady state value is strictly lower than unity, it can appear that rising the degree
of the increasing returns have a negative impact on aggregate production. When there is a positive
relationship between increasing returns and production (that is for a positive externality of production),
the welfare-maximizing path is unambiguously increasing.
In any case, whether decreasing or not, the welfare-maximizing path exhibits a decreasing ratio
C¤(0)=Cs as the degree of increasing returns rises.
5 Economic arguments
In optimal growth models µ a la Benhabib and Farmer with social increasing returns to scale and productive
externalities, Christiano and Harrison [1999] distinguish two e®ects a®ecting the consumption/investment
11The impact of a on the condition for indeterminacy is more ambiguous: an increase strengthens the condition for
1 + ° ¡ µ > 0 and weakens it otherwise.
8Figure 3:
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plans. F or a given technological coe±cient (a given productive externality), the concavity of the utility
function prevents from °uctuations which deteriorate welfare. This \concavity e®ect" leads to choose
monotonic equilibria and smooth consumption and labor over time so as to maximize the representative
agent's welfare. However, as the productive externality increases with the average economy-wide levels
of capital and labor, it may be welfare-improving to bunch hard work in the ¯rst periods to boost capital
accumulation in order to bene¯t from a higher productive externality in the next while maintaining a






















When the \bunching e®ect" dominates the \concavity e®ect", agents bring forward a part of their
labor supply , raising the average level of consumption and decreasing labor after a while. On the ¯gure
above, we pictured the welfare-maximizing paths of capital, consumption and labor for ° = 0:044: they
clearly show how cycles can make the agents better-o®.
On the one hand, a higher level of increasing returns to scale makes capital accumulation larger for
the same amount of worked hours or equivalently allows the representative agent to raise consumption
without raising labor. On the other hand, the higher the level of increasing returns to scale, the higher
the steady state value of capital: the average level of labor required to reach this steady state value
appears to be higher when the consumption path is monotonic since agents do not bene¯t from the non-
convexities of the production function. The conjunction of these two e®ects explain why it is important
9to bunch hard work when the degree of increasing returns to scale is su±cient. In that case, consumption
and capital remain during several periods above their steady state values whereas labor remains below.
Agents accumulate the capital stock during the ¯rst periods, which erodes gradually afterwards: they use
this capital stock accumulated to conciliate a high level of consumption with a moderate level of labor.
However, even though it can be conjectured from Dupor and Lehnert [2002] that an optimality of
cycles is intrinsically associated to indeterminacy provided there are aggregate decreasing returns on
capital, the welfare-maximizing path may be monotonic: capital, consumption and labor lay below their
steady state values forever (but get closer over time).12 Since ¯rms consider the productive externality as
given while at the symmetric equilibrium it increases when ¯rms increase their production, there exists a
threshold below which it is not optimal to bunch hard work if not intensively. For low level of increasing
returns to scale, cycles might be optimal provided agents su±ciently bunch hard work: if not, the capital
stock does not increase su±ciently while disutility of labor signi¯cantly rises. Agents are not able to raise
the average level of consumption su±ciently to compensate the welfare loss caused by the periods of hard
working. As the degree of increasing returns increases the decentralized non-monotonic equilibrium paths
provide periods of hard working more likely to su±ciently rise the capital stock and ¯nally the average
level of consumption that compensate the welfare loss of the periods of hard working.
Thus, when the degree of increasing returns to scale is low, choosing a monotonic path allows the
agents to gradually accumulate the capital stock and prevents them from paying a stringent tribute in
terms of welfare that the increase in consumption cannot compensate. This is especially the case when
the level of increasing returns is close to the lower bound insuring indeterminacy: the \bunching e®ect" is
not strong enough (as it might be from a social planner's viewpoint) to dominate the \concavity e®ect".
Far from accelerating capital accumulation, agents are better-o® when they smooth consumption and
labor over time. As increasing returns become more and more important, the \bunching e®ect" is more
likely to o®set the \concavity e®ect" and the welfare-maximizing path is all the less monotonic since the
degree of externalities increases.
Whether monotonic or not, the welfare-maximizing path embodies a decreasing C¤(0)=Cs ratio as
the degree of increasing returns raises. This decrease means that the welfare-maximizing initial value of
consumption increases slower than its steady state value. Actually, as the degree of increasing returns
raises, agents can improve their welfare by both increasing the average level of consumption (then its
steady state value) and decreasing or increasing moderately the number of worked hours, especially during
the ¯rst periods: the rise in the productive externality alone insures a faster and higher accumulation of
the capital stock. As pictured in ¯gure 6, although the welfare-maximizing di®erence ^ U(c¤(0)) increases
very slightly as the degree of increasing returns raises, choosing the minimizing labor variance path
starting with c(0) = c0;»2 deteriorates exponentially welfare. The loss of welfare remains limited as long
as the welfare-maximizing path is monotonic; as soon as the welfare-maximizing path exhibits cycles,
the loss substantially increases and reveals the price to pay for not using the bunching e®ect to reach
continuously increasing steady state values of consumption and capital.
Finally, since the welfare-maximizing path is much more easier to compute than the optimal equilib-
rium of this economy, it represents a second-best equilibrium and an important observation for judging
the desirability of a stabilization policy, whose performances in terms of welfare can be compared with
it.
6 Stabilization policy and welfare-maximizing path
6.1 Guo and Lansing tax policy
We apply to the Wen framework [1998] a speci¯c version of the Guo and Lansing stabilization policy
developed in the one-sector Benhabib and Farmer model [1994]. This policy consists of a countercyclical
12It can be proved that for optimal values of the capital stock and its costate variable the optimal value of labor must be
a corner solution when the condition for indeterminacy holds in Benhabib and Farmer [1994], Benhabib and Farmer [1996]
or Wen [1996]. The existence of a chattering solution in such model is very likely. By contrast, Christiano and Harrison
[1999]have shown that the solution is monotonic when the aggregate production function exhibits constant marginal returns
on capital, that is when ® = 1.
10tax on production ¿(t) (or equivalently a tax on both capital and labor incomes):13





with Á > 0:
In this case, each agent faces the same tax rate which increases with the national income. Finally,
the law of motion of capital becomes:
_ K(t) = [(1 ¡ ¿(t))r(t) ¡ ±]K(t) + (1 ¡ ¿(t))w(t)L(t) ¡ C(t) + T(t):
It can be shown that the steady state does not vary from what we have previously computed while
the new eigenvectors are such that:
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µ¯(1 ¡ Á) + ®(1 ¡ Á)(1 + Â) ¡ µ(1 + Â)
:
The modi¯ed condition for determinacy is satis¯ed when ¯ µ
µ=(1¡Á)¡® ¡1¡Â < 0.14 For the minimum
value of Á insuring determinacy, the stabilizing saddle-path solution so obtained is such that:
~ c(t) » ~ c0;»2e¸
0
2





2 = a(ª ¡ ±)
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ Á)
a ¡ ®(1 ¡ Á)
:
The stabilizing saddle-path solution is then close to the equilibrium path starting with c(0) = c0;»2:
both paths start with the same initial conditions [k(0);c(0)] and converge to the same steady state.
Furthermore, their growth rates, respectively ¸0
2 and ¸2 are approximatively similar for Á close enough
to zero (see appendix A.4 for more details). In the limit case, when µ
µ¡® tends to 1+Â an in¯nitely small
Á can be chosen to suppress indeterminacy and the stabilizing saddle-path equilibrium tends to merge
with the indeterminate equilibrium path starting with c(0) = c0;»2. In that case, we have shown that this
latter path coincides with the welfare-maximizing path. The Guo and Lansing policy is then as good as
the welfare-maximizing path for in¯nitely low levels of increasing returns.
However, it is clear on the simulations above that the loss in welfare for an agent maintaining c0;»2 as
a starting level of consumption (which is the case of the Guo and Lansing policy) increases exponentially
with the level of increasing returns. As this level goes up the \bunching e®ect" raises and theoretically
may o®set the \concavity e®ect": the welfare-maximizing path is less and less monotonic while the Guo
and Lansing tax policy leads the agents to smooth their consumption/investment plans. For plausible
values of the increasing returns, the cost of the stabilization policy appears rapidly prohibitive and it
seems more interesting to ¯nd an alternative stabilization policy that pins down expectations on the
welfare-maximizing path rather than on the Guo and Lansing saddle-path solution.
13A similar stabilization policy in which the tax would be redistributed in guise of a proportional lump sum transfer
T(t) = ¿(t)¹ Y (t) (where ¹ Y represents the average economy-wide levels of output) would make the agents better-o® compared
to the original Guo and Lansing policy. However, this policy does not change the main conclusions we draw in this section.
14In comparison, the original condition for indeterminacy and determinacy in Benhabib and Farmer [1994] and Guo and
Lansing [1998] are respectively ¯ ¡ 1 ¡ Â > 0 and ¯(1 ¡ Á) ¡ 1 ¡ Â < 0.
116.2 Alternative economic policy
Actually, the welfare-maximizing path can be selected through an alternative stabilization policy which
is able to coordinate over time the agents on a given deterministic path.
Assume that the stationary equilibrium is indeterminate and that the government aims at coordinating
the expectations on a deterministic indeterminate path characterized by the initial level of consumption




0. The economic policy
consists in subsidizing or taxing production such that the rate of returns on capital equals ¹ r0 by ¯xing a
tax rate ¿0 (possibly negative) at the ¯rst period. Firms maximize their pro¯t ¦0:
¦0 = (1 ¡ ¿0)Y0 ¡ r0K0 ¡ w0L0;
with:
¿0 = 1 ¡ ¹ r0=r0:
Since K0 and ¹ r0 are predetermined, the equality of the after-tax rental rate of capital to the after-tax
productivity of capital determines the quantity of labor at time 0:
L0 = (¹ r0=aK®
0 )1=¯ = ¹ L0:
Simultaneously, the couple (K0;L0) determines the equilibrium value of the ¯rst period after-tax real
wage satisfying the second ¯rst order condition of pro¯t maximization:




Finally, the ¯rst order condition (respect to labor) determines consumption at time 0, that is ¹ C0, which
in turn determines the variation of capital and consumption at the next period via the law of motion of
capital and the Euler equation. If the agents are rational, and we assume they are, they cannot switch
to another equilibrium (which would be in contradiction with the FOCs) and are able to determine the
triple (Kt;Lt;Ct) at any time t. Of course, expectations can be coordinated by ¯xing the real wage or
the rental rate of any period, not especially the ¯rst one.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a possible use of the linear-quadratic approximation already investigated
by Benigno and Woodford [2006a, 2006b] in various economic problems: a welfare-ranking of alternative
deterministic equilibrium paths in a one-sector growth model exhibiting local indeterminacy under a
plausible degree of social increasing returns. The di®erent equilibrium paths are ranked according to
their initial value of consumption. We have shown that the initial value of consumption is all the higher
and the welfare-maximizing path all the less monotonic since the degree of increasing returns is high. A
direct implication of these ¯ndings is that progressive or countercyclical tax policies, as those developed
by Guo and Lansing [1998], able to pin down expectations on a unique and smooth equilibrium path are
likely to be welfare-diminishing in the presence of a su±ciently high productive externality compared to
an indeterminate (deterministic or stochastic) equilibrium trajectory. Thus, the welfare-maximizing path
provides an interesting second-best equilibrium when it is not possible to say anything about the nature
of the social planer's trajectory.
At last, we have presented an alternative stabilization policy that pins down expectations on this
welfare-maximizing path. In absence of precise knowledge of the optimal trajectory, this stabilization
policy represents at least welfare improvement properties for economic agents compared to a laissez-faire
or to a Guo and Lansing policy.
12A Appendix
A.1 Dynamical system and steady state
Let H be the current value Hamiltonian of the programme:











and Y = A[uK]aLb = [uK]®L¯ (at the symmetric equilibrium).
The ¯rst-order conditions for an interior solution are:
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The production function at the equilibrium can be rewritten in log-terms:
y = ®k + ®À + ¯l;
where x = lnX and À = lnu. Then, using equations (14) to (16) and substituting the value of u, ¤ and
L respect to Y , C and K in the production function, one gets the following linear relationship:
y ¡ k = ¹0 + ¹1k + ¹2c;
with ¹0 = ¡
®(1+Â)ln(a=µ¿)+µ¯ lnb
µ¯+®(1+Â)¡µ(1+Â) ; ¹1 =
µ[(1¡®)(1+Â)¡¯]
µ¯+®(1+Â)¡µ(1+Â) and ¹2 =
µ¯
µ¯+®(1+Â)¡µ(1+Â). And ¯nally, the
global dynamics of the model can be derived as the system of two equations in two unknowns, c and k,
expressed in equations (3) and (4).
The steady state equilibrium can then be derived by equalizing _ C and _ K to zero:
Ls =
µ
(½ + ±)(1 ¡ a)




















where ± ´ ¿uµ
s is the steady state value of the depreciation rate of capital. The value given to the
parameter ± imposes the value of µ: at the steady state, ± =
½
µ¡1.
A.2 Slopes of the stable arms












































































13or equivalently that the slope of the stable arm associated to »2 is steeper than the slope of the stable
arm associated to »1 at the stationary equilibrium.
























¸i ¡ a¹2(1 ¡ 1
µ)ª
: (19)
Moreover when the condition for local indeterminacy is satis¯ed, that is when ¯ > µ¡®
µ (1 + Â), with
µ > ®, we have that ¹2 > 0 and then the denominator of (19) is negative. On the other hand the
sign of the numerator is negative when ¹1 < 0, or equivalently ¯ > (1 ¡ ®)(1 + Â). This inequality is
indeed always veri¯ed under the local indeterminacy condition since µ¡®
µ > 1 ¡ ® for any choice of the
parameters. This proves that v2i
v1i is always greater than zero.
Finally since ¸1 < ¸2 it follows immediately from equation (19) that the slope of the stable arm
associated to »2, v22=v12, is steeper than the slope of the stable arm associated to »1, v21=v11. If we
assume the economy starts with an initial stock of capital lower (resp. greater) than its steady state
value, ~ k(0) < 0 (resp. ~ k(0) > 0) and from equations (9) and (10) it is easily deduced that c0;»1 > c0;»2
(resp. c0;»1 < c0;»2).
A.3 Monotonic paths
Monotonicity of consumption paths occurs provided the equation d~ c(t)=dt = 0 has no solution. This
means that there is no t 2 R+ such that for any (´1;´2):







v22~ k(0) ¡ v12~ c(0)







A solution exists if and only if E ´
v22~ k(0)¡v12~ c(0)





[v12v21 ¡ v11v22]~ k(0) ¡ v11v12"
;
where vij < 0 for any i;j = f1;2g (as shown in appendix A:2).










> c0;»1 ¡ c0;»2;
or equivalently for:
c(0) > c0;»1:










< c0;»2 ¡ c0;»1;
or equivalently for:
c(0) < c0;»2 ¡ "¤;
with "¤ ´ c0;»1 ¡c0;»2, which is positive (resp. negative) according to Appendix A:2 provided K(0) < Ks
(resp. K(0) > Ks).
Thus consumption paths have a monotonic behavior if and only if c0 2 [c0;»2 ¡"¤;c0;»1] for K(0) < Ks
and c0 2 [c0;»1;c0;»2 ¡ "¤] for K(0) > Ks.
14A.4 Solution of some limits
The trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix J are the following:






















When the condition for indeterminacy holds, one can see immediately that Tr(J) tends to ¡1 and
Det(J) tends to +1 as ¯ µ
µ¡® ¡ 1 ¡ Â tends to zero. Moreover the two limits have the same \order" of






















































[1] Benigno, P. and Woodford, M. (2006a). \Optimal Taxation in an RBC Model: A Linear-Quadratic
Approach". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 1445-1489;
[2] Benigno, P. and Woodford, M. (2006b). \Linear-Quadratic Approximation of Optimal Policy
Problems". NBER Working Paper, No. 12672.
[3] Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R. (1994). \Indeterminacy and increasing returns". Journal of Economic
Theory 63, 19-41;
[4] Benhabib, J. and Farmer, R. (1996). \Indeterminacy and sector-speci¯c externalities". Journal of
Monetary Economics 37, 421-443;
[5] Christiano, L. and Harrison, S. (1999). \Chaos, sunspots and automatic stabilizers". Journal of
Monetary Economics 44, 3-31;
[6] Federal Reserve Bank (2008). \Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization: The 2008 Annual
Revision". Federal Reserve statistical release, G.17 (419) 2008 Historical and Annual Revision;
[7] Fleming, Wendell H. (1971). \Stochastic Control for Small Noise Intensities". SIAM Journal of
Control, 9, 473-517;
[8] Guo, J. and Lansing, K. (1998). \Indeterminacy and stabilization policy". Journal of Economic
Theory 82, 481-490;
[9] Guo, J.T. and Harrison, S. (2001). \Tax Policy and Stability in a Model with Sector-Speci¯c
Externalities". Review of Economic Dynamics 4, 75-89;
[10] Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, Gregory W. Hu®man (1988). \Investment, Capacity Utilization,
and the Real Business Cycle". American Economic Review, 78 (3), 402-417;
[11] Hansen, Gary D. (1985). \Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle". Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 16, 309-325;
[12] Kim, J. and Kim, H.S. (2004). \Spurious Welfare Reversal in International Business Cycle Models".
Journal of International Economics, 60, 471-500;
[13] Magill, Michael J.P. (1977). \A Local Analysis of N-Sector Capital Accumulation under Uncer-
tainty". Journal of Economic Theory, 15, 211-218;
[14] Nadiri, M. Ishaq and Prucha Ingmar R. (1997). \Estimation of the Depreciation Rate of Physical
and R&D Capital in the U.S. Total Manufacturing Sector". NBER Working Paper, No. W4591.
[15] Russell, T. and Zecevic A. (1998). \Lyapunov stability, regions of attraction, and indeterminate
growth paths". Economics Letters, 58 (3), 319-324;
16[16] Russell, T. and Zecevic A. (2000). \Indeterminate Growth Paths and Stability". Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, 39-62;
[17] Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M. (2004). \Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models Using a
Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
28, 755-775;
[18] Sim, N.C.S. (2005). \Indeterminacy, Stabilization Policy and Returns to Scale: A Re-Investigation".
Contributions to Macroeconomics 5, art.3;
17Working Papers of the Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
(PDF-ﬁles of the Working Papers can be downloaded at www.cer.ethz.ch/research).
08/99 M. Bambi and A. Sa¨ ıdi




08/97 H. Gersbach and R. Winkler
International Emission Permit Markets with Refunding
08/96 K. Pittel and L. Bretschger
Sectoral Heterogeneity, Resource Depletion, and Directed Technical Change: Theory
and Policy
08/95 M. D. K¨ onig, S. Battiston, M. Napoletano and F. Schweitzer
The Eﬃciency and Evolution of R&D Networks
08/94 H. Gersbach and F. M¨ uhe
Vote-Buying and Growth
08/93 H. Gersbach
Banking with Contingent Contracts, Macroeconomic Risks, and Banking Crises
08/92 J. Daubanes
Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: Are subsidies necessary?
08/91 R. Winkler
Optimal control of pollutants with delayed stock accumulation
08/90 S. Rausch and T. F. Rutherford
Computation of Equilibria in OLG Models with Many Heterogeneous Households
08/89 E. J. Balistreri, R. H. Hillberry and T. F. Rutherford
Structural Estimation and Solution of International TradeModels with Heteroge-
neous Firms
08/88 E. Mayer and O. Grimm
Countercyclical Taxation and Price Dispersion
08/87 L. Bretschger
Population growth and natural resource scarcity: long-run development under seem-
ingly unfavourable conditions
08/86 M. J. Baker, C. N. Brunnschweiler, and E. H. Bulte
Did History Breed Inequality? Colonial Factor Endowments and Modern Income
Distribution08/85 U. von Arx and A. Ziegler
The Eﬀect of CSR on Stock Performance: New Evidence for the USA and Europe
08/84 H. Gersbach and V. Hahn
Forward Guidance for Monetary Policy: Is It Desirable?
08/83 I. A. MacKenzie
On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations
08/82 I. A. MacKenzie, N. Hanley and T. Kornienko
A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market
08/81 D. Schiess and R. Wehrli
The Calm Before the Storm? - Anticipating the Arrival of General Purpose Tech-
nologies
08/80 D. S. Damianov and J. G. Becker
Auctions with Variable Supply: Uniform Price versus Discriminatory
08/79 H. Gersbach, M. T. Schneider and O. Schneller
On the Design of Basic-Research Policy
08/78 C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte
Natural Resources and Violent Conﬂict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the
Onset of Civil Wars
07/77 A. Sch¨ afer, S. Valente
Habit Formation, Dynastic Altruism, and Population Dynamics
07/76 R. Winkler
Why do ICDPs fail? The relationship between subsistence farming, poaching and
ecotourism in wildlife and habitat conservation
07/75 S. Valente
International Status Seeking, Trade, and Growth Leadership
07/74 J. Durieu, H. Haller, N. Querou and P. Solal
Ordinal Games
07/73 V. Hahn
Information Acquisition by Price-Setters and Monetary Policy
07/72 H. Gersbach and H. Haller
Hierarchical Trade and Endogenous Price Distortions
07/71 C. Heinzel and R. Winkler
The Role of Environmental and Technology Policies in the Transition to a Low-
carbon Energy Industry
07/70 T. Fahrenberger and H. Gersbach
Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions07/69 H. Gersbach and R. Winkler
On the Design of Global Refunding and Climate Change
07/68 S. Valente
Human Capital, Resource Constraints and Intergenerational Fairness
07/67 O. Grimm and S. Ried
Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union
07/66 O. Grimm
Fiscal Discipline and Stability under Currency Board Systems
07/65 M. T. Schneider
Knowledge Codiﬁcation and Endogenous Growth
07/64 T. Fahrenberger and H. Gersbach
Legislative Process with Open Rules
07/63 U. von Arx and A. Sch¨ afer
The Inﬂuence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance
07/62 H. Gersbach
The Global Refunding System and Climate Change
06/61 C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte
The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and Red Herrings
06/60 R. Winkler
Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting
06/59 U. Brandt-Pollmann, R. Winkler, S. Sager, U. Moslener and J.P. Schl¨ oder
Numerical Solution of Optimal Control Problems with Constant Control Delays
06/58 F. M¨ uhe
Vote Buying and the Education of a Society
06/57 C. Bell and H. Gersbach
Growth and Enduring Epidemic Diseases
06/56 H. Gersbach and M. M¨ uller
Elections, Contracts and Markets
06/55 S. Valente
Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation
06/54 H. Fehr-Duda, M. Sch¨ urer and R. Schubert
What Determines the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function?
06/53 S. Valente
Trade, Envy and Growth: International Status Seeking in a Two-Country World
06/52 K. Pittel
A Kuznets Curve for Recycling